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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-4645 
____________ 
 
MICHAEL T. D'ALESSANDRO, 
            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF NEWARK 
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the District of New Jersey  
(D.C. No. 08-cv-01886) 
District Judge: Hon. Peter Sheridan 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a), 
November 15, 2011 
 
BEFORE:  FUENTES, CHAGARES, Circuit Judges and RESTANI,*
 
 Judge 
(Opinion Filed:  December 13, 2011) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
                                              
*  Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge of the United States Court of 
International Trade, sitting by designation.  
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant Michael D’Alessandro appeals from the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment in favor of his former employer, the City of Newark, 
on his federal and state claims for gender and age discrimination.  We will affirm. 
I.  
As we write solely for the parties, we discuss only those facts necessary to our 
decision.  
D’Alessandro was employed as an attorney in the City’s Law Department from 
2001 through 2006.  He was over forty years old when he was hired.  During his five 
years employed by the City, D’Alessandro was counseled repeatedly for his deficient 
performance.  While employed by the Civil Litigation Section, Assistant Corporation 
Counsel Pidgeon, an approximately 60 year old male, wrote numerous memoranda 
detailing incidents of D’Alessandro’s deficient performance.  In 2002, at Pidgeon’s 
request, he was transferred to the Municipal Prosecutor’s Office, then headed by Albert 
Mrozik, an almost fifty year old male.  In his four years there, his supervisors wrote 
multiple memoranda detailing his poor performance or and his violations of City policy.  
For example, on one occasion D’Alessandro was discovered to be practicing law 
privately, which is forbidden by City policy.  The last such memorandum was written 
only a few months before he was terminated.  
In September 2006, D’Alessandro was terminated.  At his termination meeting he  
was informed that he was terminated because the City “wanted to go in a different 
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direction.”  Around the same time, another attorney, a black female over the age of 40, 
was also terminated.  Later in 2006, five new attorneys were hired: one male and four 
females, one being over the age of 40.  In 2007, the City hired eight male attorneys and 
nine female attorneys, with at least 3 of these attorneys over the age of 40.  After 
exhausting his administrative remedies, D’Alessandro filed suit in district court. 2
II. 
  In his 
suit, he alleged gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and age and gender discrimination in violation 
of New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1 et seq.   
 The same standard applies to D’Alessandro’s state and federal gender and age 
discrimination claims.  Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 689 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(federal age discrimination); Jakimas v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 788 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (New Jersey law); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 
1061, 1065-66 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (federal gender discrimination).  As he offers no 
evidence of direct discrimination, his claims are analyzed under the McDonell-Douglas 
burden shifting analysis.  Smith, 589 F.3d at 689.  D’Alessandro bears the initial burden 
                                              
2  The District Court had jurisdiction  pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and 
we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a 
grant of summary judgment.  Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact” and thus “the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  A dispute of material fact is a genuine issue 
when there is evidence sufficient to support a reasonable jury returning a verdict in favor 
of the nonmoving party.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  We 
view the record in the light most favorable to D’Alessandro—the nonmoving party. Id. 
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of demonstrating a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 
F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994).  Then, the burden of production shifts to the employer to 
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.  Id.  Finally, the burden 
of production returns to D’Alessandro to show by a preponderance of the evidence that 
this rationale is pretextual by submitting evidence which “(1) casts sufficient doubt upon 
each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could 
reasonably conclude that each reason was a fabrication; or (2) allow the factfinder to infer 
that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the 
adverse employment action.”  Id. at 762.  D’Alessandro must do more than demonstrate 
that the City made a wrong or mistaken decision, rather he must show “weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” in the employer’s 
explanation that allow a reasonable factfinder to believe that the employer did not truly 
act for the asserted reason.  Id. at 765.  
 Even if D’Alessandro were able to satisfy his prima facie burden, the City has 
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination.  It is undisputed 
that for his entire tenure with the City there were significant problems with his 
performance.  Such a long history of poor performance satisfies the City’s burden.   
D’Alessandro presents no evidence that could lead a reasonable factfinder to 
conclude that these reasons were pretextual.  He does not contend that the asserted 
instances of poor performance were fabrications.   Rather, his sole evidence is that the 
City told him at his termination meeting that it was “going in a different direction” and it 
also terminated another employee who was over forty and African American, but female, 
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which on its face cuts against finding the City terminated him because of his gender.  
D’Alessandro argues that the City’s proffered reason for terminating his employment 
differs from the reason it provided him at the meeting in which he was discharged. But 
the City’s vague statement that it is changing direction is not inconsistent with its desire 
to move away from employees with the deficits exhibited by D’Alessandro. 3
III.  
   Nor does 
D’Alessandro dispute the truth of his documented performance deficiencies.  Ultimately, 
his evidence is insufficient to discredit the City’s justification for his termination or 
demonstrate that discriminatory animus was more likely than not a motivating factor in 
the City’s decision. As D’Alessandro failed to rebut the City’s legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory rationale for its termination of D’Alessandro, the District Court 
properly granted summary judgment in the City’s favor.  
 The order of the District Court will be affirmed.   
                                              
3  D’Alessandro’s reliance on this Court’s decision in Abramson v. William 
Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 284 (3d Cir. 2001) is misplaced.  There, the college 
gave no less than five separate unrelated and inconsistent reasons for its termination 
decision.  Id. at 282-83.  The reason changed multiple times prior to Abramson’s 
termination, then continued to change throughout the course of the litigation.  See id.   
